

1 Investigating the feasibility and potential of
2 combining industry AMR monitoring systems:
3 a comparison with WHO GLASS

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16 **Keywords:** antimicrobial resistance, surveillance, industry monitoring systems, GLASS

17 Abstract

18 Background

19 Efforts to estimate the global burden of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) have highlighted gaps in existing
20 surveillance systems. Data gathered from hospital networks globally by pharmaceutical industries to
21 monitor antibiotic efficacy in different bacteria represent an additional source to track the temporal
22 evolution of AMR. Here, we analysed available industry monitoring systems to assess to which extent
23 combining them could help fill the gaps in our current understanding of AMR levels and trends.

24 Methods

25 We analysed six industry monitoring systems (ATLAS, GEARS, SIDERO-WT, KEYSTONE, DREAM, and SOAR)
26 obtained from the Vivli platform and reviewed their respective isolates collection and analysis protocols.
27 Using the R software, we designed a pipeline to harmonise and combine these into a single dataset. We
28 assessed the reliability of resistance estimates from these sources by comparing the combined dataset to
29 the publicly available subset of WHO GLASS for shared bacteria-antibiotic-country-year combinations.

30 Results

31 Combined, the industry monitoring systems cover 18 years (4 years for GLASS), 85 countries (71), 412
32 bacterial species (8), and 75 antibiotics (25). Although all industry systems followed a similar centralised
33 testing approach, the criteria for isolate collection were unclear (patients selection, associated sampling
34 periods...). For *E.coli*, *K. pneumoniae* and *S. aureus*, at least 65% of comparable resistance proportions were
35 within 0.1 of the corresponding estimate in GLASS. We did not identify systemic bias towards resistance in
36 industry systems compared to GLASS.

37 Conclusions

38 Combining industry monitoring systems can substantially strengthen our knowledge of global AMR burden
39 across bacterial species and countries. High agreement values for available comparisons with GLASS
40 suggest that data for other bacteria-antibiotic-country-year combinations only present in industry systems
41 could complement GLASS, particularly for Priority Pathogens currently not covered. This valuable
42 information on resistance levels could help clinicians and stakeholders prioritize testing and select
43 appropriate antibiotics in settings with limited surveillance data.

44 Plain language summary

45 Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a growing problem worldwide, but we don't always have enough
46 information to fully understand its extent and how it's changing over time. In this study, we looked at data
47 collected by pharmaceutical companies from hospitals around the world to see how well antibiotics are
48 working against different bacteria. We wanted to see if combining these data sources could help us fill in
49 gaps in global AMR surveillance. We reviewed the methods of six different systems that collect this data
50 and developed an approach to combine them. Then, we compared this combined data to publicly available
51 GLASS data from the WHO to check if it was reliable. We found that the data from the pharmaceutical
52 companies covered more years, countries, bacterial species, and antibiotics than GLASS. Even though the
53 way the data was collected by the companies wasn't always clear, we saw that the resistance estimates
54 were similar to those from GLASS for some common bacteria like *E.coli*, *K. pneumoniae*, and *S. aureus*.
55 Overall, combining data from these different sources could improve our understanding of AMR worldwide,
56 especially in places where surveillance is currently limited, and for Priority Pathogens not covered by
57 GLASS.

58 Introduction

59 Implementing interventions to tackle the threat of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) first requires a good
60 understanding of its global public health burden. Recent studies have highlighted multiple gaps in global
61 AMR surveillance [1–3], which require new data sources to be addressed. Importantly, datasets must not
62 only be summarised in reports, but also be publicly accessible and easily downloadable to facilitate further
63 analyses by independent researchers.

64 Several initiatives have been developed to tackle AMR surveillance gaps. The most well-known include
65 GLASS by the World Health Organisation [4] or EARS-Net by the European Centre for Disease Prevention
66 and Control [5]. These initiatives provide standardised reporting guidelines to participating countries, and
67 an infrastructure to collect and present aggregated AMR data. They currently only focus on a limited
68 number of pathogens and antibiotics, but are informed by a substantial amount of isolates and are hence
69 often referred to as reliable estimates of the prevalence of AMR. In parallel, several pharmaceutical
70 companies conduct their own private global AMR reporting programs. These systems are designed to
71 monitor drug efficacy in hospital settings by collecting a large number of isolates across countries and
72 years and testing their susceptibility to a range of relevant antibiotics. Therefore, there may be an
73 important role for industry programs to play in global AMR surveillance over time, as a complementary
74 approach to public databases.

75 To the best of our knowledge, these different industry monitoring systems have been poorly explored and
76 only separately, with no attempt to combine them yet. Combining these systems could broaden the range
77 of pathogens, drugs, countries, and years covered, while also increasing the number of isolates used to
78 inform AMR point prevalence estimates. This combination, however, requires a joint review of the
79 surveillance methodologies of these different systems to clarify their similarities and differences. For
80 example, clarifying how each system collects and conducts microbiological testing of isolates is crucial to
81 determine the extent to which they can be combined and the potential biases they each have.
82 Understanding the limits of different monitoring systems is an essential first step to appropriately utilise
83 them.

84 Moreover, few studies have tried to compare AMR point prevalence estimates from different
85 supranational surveillance systems [6–9]. It is important to know how AMR estimates from industry
86 monitoring systems compare with publicly available initiatives. Agreement or differences between
87 databases could reflect different sampling strategies, such as spatial coverage within a country or patient
88 selection criteria. This information could be used to adapt sampling or coverage strategies, to provide
89 better information to clinicians and stakeholders.

90 Here, we aim to clarify the value of industry AMR monitoring systems in tackling surveillance gaps
91 worldwide. First, we evaluate the respective methodology of different systems including sampling process,
92 patient selection, antibiotic susceptibility tests to determine if they could be combined and identify any
93 challenges in this process. We then aim to assess the agreement of resistance proportions in these
94 monitoring systems, individually or combined, compared to the publicly available subset of the WHO
95 GLASS database.

96 Methods

97 Data acquisition

98 Data from Pfizer, GSK, Johnson & Johnson, Paratek, Venatorx, and Shionogi were obtained through
99 <https://amr.vivli.org>. The GLASS dataset used in this study was obtained by merging two publicly available
100 GLASS datasets obtained through different WHO sources. The first dataset was manually extracted from
101 the WHO GLASS dashboard, introduced alongside the 2022 GLASS report (dataset available from
102 <https://github.com/gleclerc/GLASS2022>). Importantly, this publicly available GLASS data does not include
103 all the data used in the official WHO report [4], since it only presents data for countries which consistently
104 reported isolates to GLASS for all years between 2017-2020. The data for some countries such as the
105 United States is therefore not downloadable to the best of our knowledge. The second dataset is the
106 complete GLASS dataset for 2019, included as supplementary electronic material alongside the 2021
107 GLASS report available from [https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Ej0a-
108 av4V5uoFw19DfZoDvcLpdvHTscfXoqJgozGiwc/edit#gid=1592777314](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Ej0a-av4V5uoFw19DfZoDvcLpdvHTscfXoqJgozGiwc/edit#gid=1592777314). We combined this dataset with the
109 one extracted from the dashboard, which increased our coverage for 2019 from 46 countries and
110 2,547,754 isolates to 71 countries and 3,131,620 isolates. The combined GLASS dataset was then used for
111 all the analyses presented in this article.

112 Comparison of surveillance programs methodologies

113 The information about the methodology and spatio-temporal coverage of the available industry
114 monitoring systems was acquired from the respective publications describing them [7,10–14]. Notably, we
115 searched for information on criteria for collection of isolates, microbiological testing protocols, and
116 reporting methods.

117 Data reformatting and combination

118 To compare AMR estimates, we identified bacteria and antibiotics covered across multiple monitoring
119 systems. We designed a flexible R script to convert minimum inhibitory concentrations (MIC) in the
120 monitoring systems to resistant/susceptible labels using CLSI and EUCAST thresholds and aggregate AMR
121 estimates across monitoring systems for any chosen combination of countries, years, bacteria, and
122 antibiotics. All isolates were aggregated regardless of the sample source (blood, urine, stool etc...), as
123 previous work has suggested resistance profiles are similar for commensal opportunistic pathogens across
124 different sample sources [15].

125 To ensure comparability between GLASS and the industry monitoring systems, for bacterial species names,
126 we assumed that AMR estimates in GLASS for “*Acinetobacter spp*” were representative of *Acinetobacter*
127 *baumannii*. In industry monitoring systems, we assumed that a *S. aureus* isolate was considered to be
128 methicillin-resistant (MRSA) if it was resistant to either methicillin, ceftazidime or oxacillin [5].

129 Definition of a resistance proportion

130 Here, we defined AMR estimates using a “resistance proportion” metric, constructed as follows: the
131 number of isolates labelled “resistant” over the total number of isolates tested (labelled “sensitive”,
132 “intermediate” and “resistant”) for a given combination of bacterial species, antibiotic agent, country and
133 year. This definition of resistance aligns with the updated EUCAST guidelines from 2021 [16].

134 Comparison of resistance proportions

135 We adapted a previously published method [9] to calculate the “agreement” of resistance proportions
136 among databases, using WHO GLASS as the reference [4]. The calculation involved determining the
137 difference between resistance proportions in industry monitoring systems and those in GLASS. We derived
138 both the average difference in resistance proportions and the proportion of comparisons with an absolute
139 difference of less than 0.1. First, we compared each industry dataset to GLASS individually. Then, we
140 combined all industry monitoring systems and assessed whether this improved the agreement.

141 Finally, we tested the relationship between the calculated resistance proportion differences and the
142 number of isolates collected by the industry monitoring systems. Relationship was quantified using
143 Spearman correlation coefficients.

144 Code availability

145 The code developed for this project is available in a GitHub repository
146 (https://github.com/qleclerc/AMR_data_prize). All analyses were conducted in R [17].

147 **Results**

148 **Overview of industry monitoring systems methodology**

149 All monitoring systems analysed here focus exclusively on invasive isolates [7,10–14]. However, since their
 150 primary purpose is to monitor drug efficacy, the focus of each system depends on the drug(s) monitored.
 151 ATLAS, GEARS, KEYSTONE and SIDERO-WT have a large coverage of antibiotics and bacterial species. On
 152 the other hand, DREAM exclusively aims to monitor bedaquiline efficacy and hence only focuses on
 153 multidrug-resistant *M. tuberculosis*. SOAR, in contrast, exclusively focuses on *S. pneumoniae* and *H.*
 154 *influenzae* (Table 1). Regardless of bacterial species, all systems except for DREAM gather isolates globally
 155 and send them to a single lab for MIC testing. ATLAS, GEARS, SIDERO-WT, and SOAR all use the services of
 156 the International Health Management Associates laboratory in the United States to conduct the MIC
 157 testing. This suggests that, in principle, the *in vitro* protocols are identical across these systems. On the
 158 other hand, DREAM sends MIC testing kits to participating labs and then relies on these labs to report their
 159 results. Lastly, while KEYSTONE explicitly distinguishes between isolates from hospital and community-
 160 acquired infections, and SOAR only represents community-acquired infections, other systems do not make
 161 this distinction. This lack of distinction may be problematic for pathogens that are known to display
 162 different resistance profiles depending on the infection setting [18,19].

163

164 **Table 1: Bacteria-antibiotic availability across industry monitoring systems compared to WHO Priority**
 165 **Pathogens list (last updated in 2017).** Green indicates presence and grey absence of the pathogen is in
 166 the corresponding monitoring system.

	SIDERO-WT (Shionogi)	GEARS (Venatorx)	KEYSTONE (Paratek)	DREAM (J&J)	SOAR (GSK)	ATLAS (Pfizer)	GLASS (WHO)
Priority 1: CRITICAL							
<i>Acitenobacter baumannii</i> , carbapenam-resistant							
<i>Pseudomonas aeruginosa</i> , carbapenam-resistant							
<i>Enterobacteriaceae</i> , carbapenam-resistant, ESBL-producing							
Priority 2: HIGH							
<i>Enterococcus faecium</i> , vancomycin-resistant							
<i>Staphylococcus aureus</i> , methicillin-resistant, vancomycin-intermediate and resistant							
<i>Helicobacter pylori</i> , clarithromycin-resistant							
<i>Campylobacter</i> spp., fluoroquinolone-resistant							
<i>Salmonellae</i> , fluoroquinolone-resistant							
<i>Neisseria gonorrhoeae</i> , cephalosporin-resistant, fluoroquinolone-resistant							
Priority 3: MEDIUM							
<i>Streptococcus pneumoniae</i> , penicillin-non-susceptible							
<i>Haemophilus influenzae</i> , ampicillin-resistant							
<i>Shigella</i> spp., fluoroquinolone-resistant							

167 The major limitation common to all systems was a lack of clarity surrounding the selection of isolates for
 168 testing. In the SIDERO-WT program, isolates are randomly collected independently of resistance profile,
 169 following predetermined quotas for the number of isolates from different bacterial species to be collected
 170 at each participating centre [10]. In other systems however, even though the methodology briefly
 171 describes eligibility criteria, it is not clear whether all eligible patients are systematically enrolled or if there
 172 is a maximum number of patients. If there is a maximum, it's unclear how these patients are chosen [7,11–
 173 14].

174 The coverage of each monitoring system is summarised in Table 2. In addition, we extracted the
 175 distribution of age groups covered in each dataset (Supplementary Figure 1). Although we were not able
 176 to compare with GLASS which does not include age, all industry monitoring systems have a similar
 177 distribution with isolates collected from individuals aged mostly between 19 and 84 years old. The
 178 exception is SIDERO, where 0-12 years old are better represented, at the expense of 65-84 years old.




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180 **Table 2: Individual dataset coverage.** The numbers of countries, pathogens and antibiotics correspond to
 181 elements that appear at least once in the dataset, but not necessarily every year.

Dataset	Years	Countries	Total isolates	Pathogens	Antibiotics
ATLAS (Pfizer)	2004-2020	83	858,233	345	45
GEARS (Venatorx)	2018-2021	59	24,782	39	13
SIDERO-WT (Shionogi)	2014-2019	51	47,615	93	14
KEYSTONE (Paratek)	2014-2020	27	83,209	162	29
DREAM (J&J)	2011-2019	11	5,928	1	12
SOAR (GSK)	2014-2016	9	2,413	2	13
GLASS (WHO)	2017-2020	71	11,855,726	8	25

182 Global coverage analysis

183 While the GLASS dataset analysed here covers 4 years, 71 countries, 8 species and resistance to 25
 184 antibiotic agents (Figure 1a), the consideration of industry monitoring systems substantially increases the
 185 global coverage, as they encompass more years (18), countries (85), species (412) and antibiotics (75)
 186 (Figure 1b). We note multiple lower-resource settings covered by industry monitoring systems that are not
 187 included in the publicly available GLASS data, such as in the Americas, Central Europe or East Asia, despite
 188 current surveillance gaps in Africa still remaining, echoing previous work on this topic [2]. However, there
 189 are approximately ten times fewer total isolates in industry monitoring systems compared to GLASS (Figure
 190 1c).




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192 **Figure 1: Global coverage of the surveillance monitoring systems. a) Coverage of the Global**
 193 **Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System (GLASS).** The coverage of GLASS presented here
 194 here only includes data publicly available from the official WHO GLASS dashboard and supplementary data from
 195 the 2021 report, and therefore differs from the coverage presented in the latest 2022 report. **b) Combined**
 196 **coverage of six industry monitoring systems (ATLAS, DREAM, GEARS, KEYSTONE, SIDERO-WT and SOAR).**
 197 **c) Number of isolates per dataset per year .**

198 Estimates of resistance across monitoring systems

199 For at least one common country and year, five bacterial species and 17 antibiotics were present in both
200 GLASS and at least one industry monitoring system (31 unique bacteria-antibiotic combinations).
201 *Salmonella* spp were also present in GLASS, ATLAS and KEYSTONE, but we excluded these bacteria from
202 the analysis since there were less than 10 comparable isolates in the industry monitoring systems. *Shigella*
203 spp were only present in GLASS but not in any industry dataset. Although some industry monitoring
204 systems included *N. gonorrhoeae*, they did not cover the same years and countries as in GLASS, hence
205 resistance proportions could not be compared.

206 We calculated resistance proportions by aggregating isolates by year, bacterial species and antibiotic to
207 observe temporal trends. Within each bacterial species, antibiotics belonging to the same class had similar
208 resistance proportions (Figure 2). The resistance proportions for *A. baumannii* are similar to those
209 presented in a recent systematic review [20], except for tigecycline which is much higher here (between
210 0.5 and 0.75, compared to 0.15). The proportion of oxacillin-resistant *S. aureus* around 0.25 here (i.e.
211 methicillin-resistant *S. aureus*) also falls within previously reported ranges [5,21]. Carbapenem resistance
212 proportions for *E. coli* and *K. pneumonia* are similar to those reported in a recent systematic review (5%
213 and 24%, respectively) [22]. Trends in resistance appear relatively stable, with the biggest changes seen
214 between 2017 and 2018 (e.g. amikacin-resistant *A. baumannii* increase, trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole-
215 resistant *E. coli* and *K. pneumoniae* increase, ampicillin-resistant *E. coli* decrease, oxacillin-resistant *S.*
216 *aureus* decrease).



217

218 **Figure 2: Resistance proportions by combinations of year-bacteria-antibiotics in the combined industry**
 219 **dataset.** Here, isolates from different countries are aggregated to calculate resistance proportions.
 220 Confidence intervals indicate mean resistance +/- margin of error. Empty panels indicate absence of data
 221 for the corresponding bacteria-antibiotic combination. Antibiotics of the same colour but with a different
 222 shade belong to the same class. The classes represented are amino: aminoglycoside; carb: carbapenems;
 223 ceph: cephalosporins; fluo: fluoroquinolones; beta: beta-lactams; col: colistin; tetra: tetracycline; trim:
 224 trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole.


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226 The agreement between resistance proportions in GLASS and in the combined industry dataset varied
 227 between bacteria-antibiotic combinations (Figure 3). For *A. baumannii*, resistance was over-represented
 228 in the industry monitoring systems compared to GLASS, except for colistin. Interestingly, *A. baumannii*
 229 resistance proportions estimates greater than 0.6 for all antibiotics were mostly in agreement between
 230 the combined industry dataset and GLASS. Agreement was high for *E. coli*, *K. pneumoniae* and *S. aureus*,
 231 with 70%, 71% and 65% of all compared resistance proportions lying within +/-0.1 of each other,
 232 respectively. The exception was ampicillin for *E. coli*, for which resistance proportion estimates were
 233 under-represented in the industry monitoring systems compared to GLASS. Finally, resistance to both

234 benzylpenicillin and ceftriaxone in *S. pneumoniae* were over-represented in industry monitoring systems
235 compared to GLASS.

236 We also evaluated the agreement of individual monitoring systems with GLASS. ATLAS contained the most
237 comparison points, but agreement of all monitoring systems compared to GLASS was good, with at least
238 45% of resistance proportions for any given combination of bacteria-monitoring systems within +/-0.1 of
239 the equivalent estimate in GLASS (Supplementary Figure 2).

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
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242 **Figure 3: Comparison of resistance proportions by combinations of country-year-bacteria-antibiotics**
243 **between the combined dataset and WHO GLASS.** A “data point” is one resistance proportion result for
244 one isolate (i.e. if a single isolate is tested for three different antibiotics, this adds up to three data points).
245 A “comparison” is one combination of bacteria, antibiotic, country, and year found in both the combined
246 dataset and GLASS (i.e. one point on the graph). Points on the solid line are comparisons where the
247 proportion of resistant bacteria is identical in the industry and GLASS datasets. Points within the dashed
248 lines are comparisons within +/-0.1 of each other. For individual industry monitoring system comparisons
249 with GLASS, see Supplementary Figure 2.

250

251 The difference between GLASS and combined industry dataset resistance proportions decreased as the
252 number of isolates available in the industry dataset increased (Figure 4a). This observation applied to all
253 WHO Regions, although the correlation was only statistically significant for America, South-East Asia and
254 Western Pacific (Figure 4b; Spearman correlation, p value < 0.05 for significance).

255 Finally, we quantified the per-country agreement for each bacteria-antibiotic combination available for
256 comparison (Supplementary Figures 3-7). The countries with the lowest agreement between the combined
257 industry dataset estimates and GLASS estimates were not systematically those with a lower mean number
258 of industry dataset isolates available to inform those estimates. Interestingly, some countries with the
259 highest number of isolates had higher disagreements (e.g. *A. baumannii* in Malaysia in Supplementary
260 Figure 3, *S. aureus* in India in Supplementary Figure 6, and *S. pneumoniae* in Japan in Supplementary Figure
261 7).



262

263 **Figure 4: Relationship between resistance proportion difference between the combined industry dataset**
 264 **and WHO GLASS and number of isolates available from the industry dataset. a) Relationship for all WHO**
 265 **Regions. b) Relationships for each WHO Region separately. Spearman correlation coefficients and**
 266 **associated p-values are indicated on the graphs.**

267 Discussion

268 Summary

269 Here, we demonstrate the potential value of merging industry monitoring systems originally aimed at
270 monitoring antibiotic efficacy in different bacteria to increase the coverage of global AMR surveillance.
271 The resistance estimates obtained from individual industry monitoring systems are similar to those from
272 GLASS, where comparison is feasible and especially for *E. coli*, *K. pneumoniae* and *S. aureus*. Consequently,
273 combining datasets in a relatively straightforward manner may not systematically result in a direct
274 “increase” in agreement compared to the reference GLASS data, particularly in cases where the agreement
275 between individual industry monitoring systems and GLASS is already high. The overall relatively good
276 agreement suggests that resistance levels for many combinations of country-year-bacteria-antibiotic
277 currently not covered in GLASS could be estimated from these industry monitoring systems. This is
278 particularly important when attempting to improve our knowledge of AMR in lower-resource settings, and
279 for Priority Pathogens that are not currently reported in GLASS (Table 1), such as *P. aeruginosa* (a critical
280 priority pathogen included in four industry monitoring systems), *E. faecium* (considered high priority,
281 included in two monitoring systems), and *H. influenzae* (listed as medium priority, found in three
282 monitoring systems).

283 In agreement with previous findings [9], we observed that the greater the number of isolates tested to
284 estimated resistance proportions by industry monitoring systems, the higher the agreement with GLASS.
285 This suggests that resistance proportion differences between industry monitoring systems and GLASS may
286 originate from limited data, rather than from a fundamental difference in the type of population from
287 which isolates were sampled. However, this may not be the case for some specific countries, where we
288 identified low agreement despite a relatively high number of isolates (Supplementary Figure 3-7). In such
289 instances, this may indicate that healthcare institutions with substantially different characteristics are
290 sampled in industry monitoring systems compared to GLASS.

291 We observed the highest disagreement for *S. pneumoniae*, where resistance to both benzylpenicillin and
292 ceftriaxone was over-represented in industry monitoring systems compared to GLASS. Upon further
293 inspection, we discovered that all data points of comparison for industry monitoring systems come solely
294 from the ATLAS system (Supplementary Figure 2a). The ATLAS system lists sample sources but does not
295 specify the type of pneumococcal disease, whether it is meningitis or non-meningitis. Knowing the type of
296 infection is crucial for establishing resistance breakpoints for both benzylpenicillin and ceftriaxone, since
297 non-meningitis infections have a high MIC breakpoint for both antibiotics (2 mg/L). In contrast, meningitis
298 infections have lower MIC breakpoints of 0.06 mg/L and 0.5 mg/L for benzylpenicillin and ceftriaxone,
299 respectively [23]. Therefore, assigning a resistance breakpoint may prove difficult in this case since it
300 depends on the type of invasive pneumococcal disease, which may “overestimate” the resistance or report
301 higher resistance than what we see in GLASS. The GLASS dataset also does not report the type of
302 pneumococcal infection, but sensitive and resistant phenotypes have already been assigned.

303 Limitations of monitoring systems

304 The main limitation in combining these industry monitoring systems was the challenge in identifying the
305 criteria used for selecting the healthcare settings which provide the samples, as well as the criteria for
306 selecting isolates for submission within these institutions. The selection process of sampled locations must
307 be clarified to confirm the respective representativeness of monitoring systems within a country and to
308 understand the differences in estimated resistance proportions across programs. For example, in cases
309 where there is overlap between countries in different monitoring systems, it is not clear if each program
310 collects isolates from different laboratories or medical institutions. In addition, understanding how isolates
311 are sampled and chosen is essential to minimise the risk of bias towards either over- or under-representing
312 resistant isolates. For example, if clinicians tend to select samples from patients for whom therapeutic
313 failure was observed, this could lead to over-representation of AMR. Hence clarifying the isolate selection
314 criteria will increase confidence in the value of AMR estimates.

315 Metadata on isolates should also be more systematically collected and harmonised. First, it would be
316 helpful to distinguish between hospital- and community-acquired infections in those isolates, for greater
317 insight into different AMR proportions in different settings. This distinction is generally made by identifying
318 if the infection was reported within 48h of hospital admission (community-acquired) or later (hospital-
319 acquired), hence information on patient hospitalisation date should be collected and compared to sample
320 date. Second, sample source is a crucial information that is broadly collected but poorly standardised
321 across monitoring systems. Within GLASS, sample sources are well categorised, clearly differentiating
322 between urine, stool, genital or blood sources. However, these sources are not exhaustive, with
323 respiratory isolates currently not included, for example. Although industry monitoring systems contain a
324 much greater diversity of sample sources, the lack of harmonised labelling prevented us from including
325 this element in our analysis. For example, the ATLAS system alone contains 97 unique labels for sample
326 sources. This should be further explored since, in some cases such as for resistance rates in *S. pneumoniae*,
327 analysing resistance proportions by sample source is necessary since MIC cut-off points vary accordingly.

328 The comparison with industry monitoring systems also highlighted several possible avenues for
329 future development of GLASS. Firstly, available numbers of tested and resistant isolates are currently
330 aggregated at the country-level. Increasing data availability by presenting phenotypic resistance at
331 the isolate-level instead would enable us to better track the evolution of multi-drug resistances and
332 allow finer comparison with industry monitoring systems. Indeed, while multi-drug resistance
333 proportions could be calculated in the currently available GLASS version, a) only total numbers of
334 isolates tested for each antibiotic are provided and b) not all isolates are tested for all antibiotics,
335 there is a risk of bias due to double counting of aggregated isolates. Secondly, there is increasing
336 interest in analysing minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) data to observe finer trends in
337 resistance evolution [9]. Susceptible/resistant labels currently reported in GLASS are clinically
338 meaningful, but only relay binary information. Instead, asking countries to report MIC data to GLASS
339 could allow finer analysis of resistance trends and earlier detection of abnormal variations. Thirdly,
340 as explained in our Methods, here we only analysed the subset of the GLASS data that was publicly
341 accessible from the GLASS website [4]. However, resistance proportions for several countries were
342 not included in this publicly accessible GLASS subset, despite values for these same countries being
343 presented in the official GLASS report. It is unclear to us why these countries are currently absent in
344 the publicly available dataset, and may indicate differences in data sharing agreements.

345 Next steps

346 To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first attempt to jointly investigate, compare, and combine
347 all available industry AMR monitoring systems. We adapted the methodology from Catalán and colleagues
348 [9], and applied it to multiple monitoring systems, using WHO GLASS as the reference dataset for
349 comparison. This type of analysis is the essential first step for any work which aims to utilise these industry
350 monitoring systems to their full potential. Without proper understanding of these methodological aspects
351 and limits, the value of results cannot be trusted. Similarly, without the ability to combine these monitoring
352 systems, we will miss opportunities to fill in gaps. Our approach can be repeated as new data are provided,
353 to keep evaluating these monitoring systems going forward and iteratively suggest improvements. The
354 code we developed to combine the monitoring systems is flexible and can be adjusted to select any
355 combination of bacteria, antibiotics, and years of interest (https://github.com/gleclerc/AMR_data_prize).

356 In parallel to our analysis, WHO released in August 2023 an updated version of their manual guiding the
357 implementation of GLASS [24]. Importantly, the bacterial species coverage will be extended to include two
358 pathogens in the WHO Priority Pathogens list (*Pseudomonas aeruginosa* and *Haemophilus influenzae*), as
359 well as *Neisseria meningitidis*, *Salmonella enterica* serovar Typhi, and *Salmonella enterica* serovar
360 Paratyphi A. Four new types of sample sources will also be included (cerebrospinal fluid, respiratory
361 samples, and rectal and pharyngeal swabs), which should facilitate future analyses of resistance stratified
362 by sample source. It is unclear if these new guidelines will be implemented in time for the 2023 or even
363 the 2024 report, but in any case, it will be interesting to revisit the comparisons we have made in our
364 analysis using future versions of GLASS.

365 Overall, this work proposes a role for industry monitoring systems to fill-in known global surveillance gaps.
366 We provide actionable points, suggestions, and comparison code for stakeholders to further improve these
367 monitoring systems, with the aim to strengthen global health systems.

368 Data Availability statement

369 The code and combined datasets used for this work are available in a GitHub repository
370 (https://github.com/qleclerc/AMR_data_prize).

371 This project contains the following underlying data:

- 372 - **Publicly available GLASS data.** This dataset contains all GLASS data which, to our knowledge, can
373 be publicly accessed from the 2022 report shinyapp and the 2021 report electronic supplementary
374 material; note that this does not include all the data used in official GLASS reports. The data is
375 available from <https://github.com/qleclerc/GLASS2022>.
- 376 - **Industry monitoring systems.** These are the six industry monitoring systems used in this analysis
377 (ATLAS, GEARS, KEYSTONE, SIDERO-WT, SOAR). Access to these datasets can be requested from
378 <https://searchamr.vivli.org/>.

379 Extended data are available online (<https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.25408525>). These contain single-
380 dataset comparisons with GLASS, age distributions, and by-country agreement between the combined
381 dataset and GLASS. These elements are presented as Supplementary Figures 1-7.

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